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The clues to understanding Locke’s Christianity are the hostility he 
shared with Shaftesbury to “priestcraft,” or the burdening of faith with 
clerical impositions, and his understanding of Jesus as the authoritative 
revealer of moral truths that so often escape reason. Despite his connec-
tions to “freethinkers” and the suspicions of high-church Anglicans, Locke 
was no deist, although Woolhouse again shies away from precise judg-
ment. His friendship, after the Glorious Revolution, with Archbishop John 
Tillotson points to his support for the archbishop’s effort to shift Anglican 
emphasis from coercion and doctrinal dispute to the reformation of behav-
ior in light of the gospel. Locke himself argued in 1689 that “No man can 
be a Christian without charity, and without that faith which works . . . by 
love” (Letter, 1690, p. 3). His non-creedal, “reasonable” Christianity and his 
adoption of toleration were answers to the excesses of sectarian “enthusi-
asm” as well as to those of intolerant churchmanship. In his preference for 
fundamental truths over theological squabbles, and in his emphasis upon 
a faith active in the practice of virtue, he was as much a herald of modern 
liberal Anglo-American Protestantism as he was the forerunner of modern 
political liberalism. All this can be gathered from Woolhouse’s finely de-
tailed biography; but as a biographer, Woolhouse too often advances detail 
over meaning.
The Meaning of Theism, edited by John Cottingham. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007. Pp. xi + 126. £17.99 (paper).
T. J. mAwSON, St Peter’s College, University of Oxford
This is the book version of the latest ratio special issue (ratio Vol. XIX, 
no. 4., Dec. 2006). As such, it is the latest in a series which, since the first 
appeared some twelve years ago (Truth in Ethics, ed. Brad Hooker 1995), 
has ranged widely across Philosophy. With this volume the focus turns 
to the philosophy of religion. More specifically, the avowed hope of the 
editor was that his contributors would ‘write with an eye to what belief 
in God, or its absence, means for the subject—what difference it makes to 
the flow and perceived significance of someone’s life’ (p. x). As is tradi-
tional with these special issues and their book versions, the papers that 
were delivered at a one-day conference in Reading the preceding Easter 
are bulked out with others from invited contributors. In this case, the 
result is a collection of papers written from a variety of perspectives—
Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, Atheist, and Agnostic—most (but not all) of 
which keep one eye at least on what the editor hoped they would keep 
an eye on. 
The full list of papers and their authors reads: “What’s God Got To Do 
With It? Atheism and Religious Practice,” by David Benatar; “What Differ-
ence Does It Make? The Nature and Significance of Theistic Belief,” by John 
Cottingham; “Philosophy, the Restless Heart and the Meaning of Theism,” 
by John Haldane; “Worshipping an Unknown God,” by Anthony Kenny; 
“Seeke True Religion. Oh, Where?,” by Michael McGhee; “The Varieties of 
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Non-Religious Experience,” by Richard Norman; and “Divine Action in 
the World” (Synopsis), by Alvin Plantinga. 
Although the editor tells us in his introduction that ‘Each author has 
provided an abstract at the start of his paper’ (p. x), sadly these abstracts 
did not survive the transition from the journal version to the book version. 
But, apart from that, in this incarnation, the papers constitute a handy little 
volume, one that is well set out and easily navigable with its good index. 
In what follows, I shall focus on one theme, which is touched on by a 
number of those contributors to this volume who keep an eye on the ques-
tion of the meaning of theism as the editor construes it: the extent to which 
assent to those propositions which characterize theism as it is usually dis-
cussed in the philosophy of religion can be disentangled from religious 
practice and the latter rationally present without the former. 
Benatar suggests that ‘there is nothing incoherent about a heretic, even 
of atheistic proportions, practising traditional Judaism’ (p. 1). The expla-
nation is that: 
an atheist might view the origin of a religious practice as unimport-
ant. It simply might not matter to a particular atheist whether the 
practice is of divine origin or a human invention. To appreciate this 
point about the origin of a religion’s practices, we might consider an 
analogy with a (non-religious) legal system. Imagine, for example, 
that it were discovered that some country’s ancient Constitution had 
not been adopted under the circumstances previously thought . . . 
Would that commit citizens to cease obeying the laws? . . . A nega-
tive answer . . . is not implausible. It just may not matter whether the 
mythology of the Constitution’s origin is true or not. (p. 7)
Of course, it may matter; some people do stop going to synagogue, church, 
or mosque, or start eating pork, shopping on a Sunday, or drinking alco-
holic beverages once they have decided that there is no God. But Benatar 
is surely right to suggest that some do not; some continue to conform 
themselves, at least outwardly, to the rules that the variant of theism to 
which they once subscribed enjoins upon its adherents even after they 
have stopped believing that it is true. If then there were nothing to reli-
gious practices other than their outer manifestations, these ‘nostalgic for-
mer believers’ (as McGhee refers to them, p. 81) could be said to continue 
on in the same religious practices as they had participated in when they 
were believers. But matters cannot be left there; some religious practices 
are constituted by more than their outer manifestations. 
In my experience, it would not be unprecedented to find in an Oxford 
College Chapel on a Sunday evening someone who would self-identify 
as an atheist or an agnostic; perhaps one might find oneself sitting beside 
Anthony Kenny, who tells us in his contribution to this volume, ‘I read the 
Bible frequently; I attend church more than once a month. . . . But in fact 
I am not a believer, I am an agnostic. Perhaps . . . I am a devout agnostic’ 
(p. 59). The mere presence of such people in chapels or churches though 
does not settle the issue of whether or not all the practices that they en-
gage in whilst sitting in their pews are the same as those that the not-yet-
former believers who we may imagine sitting beside them are engaging 
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in, even if outwardly there is nothing to differentiate them. A question 
here is whether a particular practice can count as a religious practice if it is 
done with no religious motivation. It strikes me that for some practices it 
can, but for some it cannot. Let us first consider examples of the sorts of 
practices which most obviously need a religious motivation if they are to 
be correctly counted as religious. 
If one refrains from eating pork because one thinks it has been demand-
ed by God as a sign of obedience to him, then one’s refraining from eating 
pork is a religious practice. But if one refrains from eating pork due to the 
warnings of a this-worldly dietician concerning the effect of its salt content 
on one’s blood pressure, it is not a religious practice. Neither is it if one 
refrains from it just from habit. Similarly, not shopping on a Sunday may 
be something one does for religious reasons, thinking oneself commanded 
by God to keep the Sabbath day holy and thinking that shopping is incom-
patible with this. Alternatively, it may be something one does merely out 
of habit. The shops were never open on Sunday in one’s youth, so one does 
not even think of going shopping on a Sunday now when such would be a 
possibility. In the former case, the act of not shopping is a religious one; in 
the latter, it is not. Thus losing religious beliefs and their associated moti-
vations prevents one from continuing on in certain religious practices qua 
religious practices, even if it does not prevent one continuing on with prac-
tices which, were it not for one’s altered worldview and motivations, would 
have been religious and which even now, to the outside point of view, may 
be mistaken for being religious. This, I suggest, applies to dietary and cer-
tain other practices, the objects involved in which may be specified in non-
religious terms; such practices constitute some of Benatar’s examples. The 
same is not so obviously true of Kenny’s examples—attending church and 
reading the Bible. Let us consider those next.
One might suggest that some practices get to be religious by their in-
volving certain objects the identity of which cannot be specified save in 
religious terms and they may be practiced by someone with no religious 
beliefs or motivations at all, remaining religious when so practiced in vir-
tue of the religious nature of these objects. One might suggest that attend-
ing chapel or church and reading the Bible are such practices; they in-
volve paradigmatically religious objects: a building built and maintained 
with certain religious intentions and a book that is widely regarded as 
being a communication from the divine. Now of course someone such as 
Kenny might be attending church ‘just for the music,’ but normally peo-
ple who so justify their presence there nevertheless mouth the words of 
the communal prayers that ‘fill in the time’ between choral pieces; stand 
up and sit down in parallel with others in the congregation; and so forth. 
The religiosity of a former believer’s own practice when he or she goes to 
church in this fashion; reads the Bible in this context (plausibly the same 
would not be true if he or she were reading the Bible outside the context 
of a church service, merely to enable him or her to pass a Theology exam 
the next day); listens to choral music; receives communion; and so forth 
can thus be vouchsafed by the religious intentions and beliefs of others 
with respect to the building, book in this context, art and ceremony which 
his or her practice involves. Consider the following situation as a plau-
sible analogy. 
Book revieWs 219
Suppose that, having lost all interest in football whilst a youth, you are 
now contacted by an old school friend with whom you lost touch many 
years ago. He reveals that he retains his keen interest in the sport and 
invites you to accompany him to a football match where Oxford United, 
the team you both supported as youngsters, will be playing. You fail to 
mention that you have strayed from the path of ‘football righteousness,’ 
accept his invitation, and join him in the terraces the next Saturday, having 
dug your old Oxford United scarf out of the attic and reminded yourself of 
the words of United’s chants. Despite having no interest in the game, you 
join in the scarf waving and chanting so as not to upset your friend. All 
the time you have your mind fixed on some other object. Have you spent 
your Saturday afternoon supporting Oxford United? It seems to me that 
you have. In waving the United scarf and singing the United chants, you 
have been a United supporter, regardless of your mental state or motiva-
tions; you would have been so even had you in fact been secretly willing 
the opposing team to win. The Oxford-United-supporting nature of your 
practice is generated by the Oxford-United-themed nature of the scarf 
and the socially-constituted supportive nature of the activity of waving 
scarves and singing chants. 
Similarly, it seems to me, a devout atheist might engage in certain reli-
gious practices without these religious practices’ religiosity being eviscer-
ated by his or her personal atheism as long as the religiosity is derived 
from such living traditions. I say ‘living traditions’ as it seems to me that 
the religiosity of one’s practice in such cases is parasitic upon the religious 
beliefs of those who set up and maintain the practice. If some ancient rite of 
the Egyptian religion were re-enacted by a troop of actors, each person in-
volved being motivated solely by historical curiosity, the result would not 
be the revival of the ancient Egyptian religion. If everyone’s a free-rider, 
there’s nothing left to ride on. This is not of course (not yet at least) the 
case with theism. So it is that a celebration of communion being presided 
over by a devout atheist could still be a religious ceremony despite the 
president’s atheism if enough of the congregation were theists. A devout 
atheist could still have performed the religious practice of receiving com-
munion, rather than simply eating a wafer and sipping some wine, if he or 
she attended the service in the company of theists (and of course made the 
right movements at the right time).
So some practices (e.g., not eating pork) seem to require no particular 
beliefs or motivations for their identity, but then again precisely because 
of this they cannot be counted as religious practices unless they have a re-
ligious motivation (there is nothing inherently religious about not eating 
pork). Thus they may be persisted in, but not as religious practices, after 
one has abandoned one’s religious beliefs. Other practices require no reli-
gious motivation from the person partaking in them to retain their religios-
ity as practices, because their religiosity is imbued by the religious objects 
that form their focus (e.g., attending church). One can retain these practices, 
and retain them as religious practices, after having abandoned one’s reli-
gion. Yet a third class of religious practices might seem to be closed off from 
non-believers in a more radical way than those we have so far discussed. 
Once one has come to the belief that the person that one had believed 
oneself to have been talking to on the telephone is in fact a looped auto-
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mated message from the telephone company telling one that the number 
one has dialled is unobtainable, one may continue speaking down the 
telephone line, but one cannot continue in a conversation. One cannot be 
in conversation with someone without believing or at least hoping oneself 
to be. Similarly, for the act of articulating certain words to be the act of 
participating in private prayer, one must suppose that it is at least possible 
that there is someone supernatural to whom one is speaking. The same 
considerations apply mutatis mutandis to acts of worship; one has to view 
one’s act of worship as directed towards something worshipful if one is to 
conceive of it as an act of worship and one has to conceive of it as an act of 
worship if it is to be an act of worship. If one does not think that there is 
anything to be worshiped, then one can sing ‘Worship’ songs all one likes 
but one cannot worship with them. However, perhaps nothing stronger 
than the supposed possibility of someone hearing one’s prayer or being 
the object of one’s worship is required. 
Elsewhere Kenny has said that:
There is no reason why someone who is in doubt about the existence 
of God should not pray for help and guidance on this topic as in 
other matters. Some find something comic in the idea of an agnostic 
praying to a God whose existence he doubts. It is surely no more 
unreasonable than the act of a man adrift in the ocean, trapped in a 
cave, or stranded on a mountainside, who cries for help though he 
may never be heard or fires a signal which may never be seen. (A. 
Kenny, The God of the Philosophers [Clarendon, 1979], p. 129)
And Cottingham suggests in his contribution to this volume that focusing 
on ‘metaphysical freight,’ as he puts it, is misguided, for it:
invites us to suppose that preparedness to assent to a metaphysi-
cal proposition about the existence of this divine supernatural entity 
is a prerequisite for embarking on the path of spiritual praxis. Yet it 
may turn out instead that intimations of the divine are available only 
to those who are prepared and trained, through such praxis, to ap-
proach God in humility and awe, to risk the vulnerability of trust 
and hope where there is no ‘external’ epistemic warrant or prior de-
monstrative certification. (p. 37)
There seems to me to be something in this. One need not be as willing as 
Cottingham to accept that it may turn out that nobody may receive ‘inti-
mations of the divine’ or ‘approach God’ if ever there is external epistemic 
warrant or demonstrative certification for their belief in Him, but it does 
seem plausible to say that for most who believe, the relationship between 
their belief and their praxis is at least somewhat as Kenny and Cottingham 
suggest, and thus theists and devout agnostics such as Kenny are closer 
than one would have been led to think by focusing on the different ‘meta-
physical freight’ that they carry. 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that if we were to consider one man 
who said that there was a German plane in the sky and another who said 
that he was not sure, we would say that they were close together, but if we 
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were to consider instead one man who said he believed in the Last Judge-
ment and another who said that he was not sure, we would say that there 
was a great gulf between them. Now consider entering a church on three 
successive days and overhearing on each occasion three different solitary 
men articulating the words of the Lord’s Prayer. When questioned, the 
first says he is doing so in the firm conviction that there is a God who 
hears him; the second says he is doing so in the hope that there is a God 
who hears him; the third says that he is doing so out of habit, with no 
thought as to the meanings of the words he uses and no beliefs one way or 
the other about whether or not there is a God to hear them. Would we not 
say that, whatever the gulf between the first two, the first two were a lot 
closer together than either was to the third? And would not most theists 
say that their own religious lives find them vacillating between the posi-
tions held by the first two, slipping into the third only when at their least 
reflective? Is this condition not, as Cottingham suggests, a part of what it 
must almost universally mean—in his sense of ‘mean’—to be a theist this 
side of the grave? 
To these and related questions most of the contributors to this volume 
have something to say; some pursue their own lines, which do not take 
them past these issues but are not without interest in their own right. The 
volume as a whole is accessible, both in style and length; it could easily 
be read in an afternoon, leaving the evening free to contemplate the ques-
tions it raises and answers it proffers, or alternatively to attend chapel.
The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics, by Michael 
B. Gill. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. 359. $85.00
NeIL g. rOberTSON, University of King’s College, Halifax, NS, Canada
Michael Gill’s new book tells the story of a crucial development, indeed 
transformation, of moral philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries: namely, with David Hume, the rise of a consistent and well-
grounded secular ethics—an ethics that need make no reference to God or 
even an extra-human order to explain and justify morality. Gill’s story is 
by no means comprehensive of the ethical theories available at this time; 
rather, Gill has focused his attention on a particular line of development 
from the Cambridge Platonists through Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to 
David Hume. The analysis is framed by what Gill calls “the question of 
human nature.” The book has a wonderful shape to it because it follows 
this line of development as defined by this question. Gill frames the story 
as one of a continually developing inheritance where each figure takes up 
the moral theory of his predecessor and develops it by resolving an inter-
nal tension in that previous account.
Gill evidently has a full grasp of his material and the surrounding sec-
ondary literature and yet, because of the narrative drive of the volume 
and the clarity of analysis in the interpretations offered, the book is both 
eminently readable and full of material to provoke the thought of scholar 
